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Protecting the Compromised Worker: A
Challenge for Employment Discrimination
Law
PETER SIEGELMAN†
Only the very best workers are completely satisfactory, and they
are not likely to be discriminated against–the cost of discrimination
is too great. The law tries to protect average and even belowaverage workers against being treated more harshly than would be
the case if they were of a different race, sex, religion, or national
origin, but it has difficulty achieving this goal because it is so easy
to concoct a plausible reason for not hiring, or firing, or failing to
promote, or denying a pay raise to, a worker who is not superlative. 1

INTRODUCTION
It is a truth universally acknowledged that employment
discrimination plaintiffs do not do well.2 Win rates at trial are
very low, the lowest of any category of disputes with the
exception of prisoner complaints. Although the data on
settlement outcomes are much sparser, it is almost
† Phillip I. Blumberg Prof., University of Connecticut Law School:
peter.siegelman@law.uconn.edu. Over many years, I’ve benefitted from countless
helpful conversations with Ian Ayres, Jon Bauer, John Donohue and Alexandra
Lahav (both of whom also provided extensive comments on this draft), Michael
Fischl, Sachin Pandya, and Jonathan Vogel, and I’m grateful for support from
Bob Nelson, Laura Beth Nielsen and the American Bar Foundation. Terrific
research assistance was provided by David McGrath and Erica McKenzie. I
received helpful comments by participants at a session of the Law & Society
Association organized by Margo Schlanger, and a symposium at the University of
Chicago Law School organized by Richard McAdams. I’m also grateful for careful
editing of the manuscript by the Buffalo Law Review staff. Opinions and
conclusions, especially mistaken ones, are all mine.
1. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1987) (opinion by
Judge Posner).
2. Throughout this Article, I focus on plaintiffs in federal district courts
pursuing antidiscrimination claims under Title VII, § 1981, the ADA, and the
ADEA, but especially the first two of these.
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impossible to believe that outcomes in settled cases are much
more favorable to plaintiffs than litigation is, and many cases
are dropped without any payment from the defendant at all.3
So it is very unlikely that plaintiffs are doing well in the cases
whose outcomes we cannot observe.
Lawyers and social scientists have offered a variety of
explanations for the poor performance of employment
discrimination plaintiffs; indeed, the question of why
plaintiffs do so badly (and what we can do about it)
sometimes seems to be the dominant issue in employment
discrimination scholarship. Some observers focus on the
problems inherent in proving intentional discrimination,
especially in the presence of unconscious discriminatory
animus or pre-cognitive stereotypes.4 Others stress the
apparent bias of judges and juries (especially in race
discrimination cases), or their inability/unwillingness to take
discrimination claims seriously.5 Still others complain of an
epidemic of illegitimate lawsuits, suggesting that the reason
plaintiffs do so badly is simply because they bring such weak

3. But see Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of
Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
111, 144 (2007) (finding, based on confidential settlement records, that
employment discrimination claimants obtained an average of $54,651 in cases
that settled between 1999 and 2005).
4. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
5. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,
456 (2004) (suggesting that “[o]ne can easily see that [employment
discrimination] plaintiffs do not do well in the lower courts, but it is difficult to
say why.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup
Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1328 (1998)
(“Discrimination adjudications . . . may be even more vulnerable to . . . intergroup
bias than the [underlying employment] decision tasks which give rise to them.”).
But on appeal, judges appear to have a double standard, harshly scrutinizing
employees’ victories while gazing benignly at employers’ victories. See, e.g.,
Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61
LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) (writing that “[w]hen it comes to race cases . . . courts
often seem mired in a belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious, brought
by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the
way,” although suggesting the reverse is more often the case).
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cases.6 Scott Moss has recently argued that a significant piece
of the problem is the endemically poor performance of
plaintiffs’ lawyers.7
All of these stories have at least some plausibility.
Intentional discrimination is difficult to prove, especially
without smoking-gun evidence that employers are usually
smart enough not to reveal. In the absence of such evidence,
judges sometimes seem reluctant to attribute illicit
motivation to events that can be framed in other ways. Some
lawsuits probably are without merit (although it is hard to
see how there could be sufficient numbers of such cases to
drive aggregate win rates down to the low levels we now
observe), and not all are strong.8
But all these stories miss an important aspect of the
employment discrimination landscape, a key structural
6. See WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 62 (1997) (“[B]eing fired is still by far the
most common reason . . . to sue, and protected-group status . . . has increasingly
served such workers as ‘something to hang their hat on’ to get into
court . . . . There is no need to speculate about whether the law gets used in this
fashion: lawyers’ own literature confirms that it routinely does . . . . [One lawyer
advises that protected class workers] . . . should ‘call a lawyer
immediately’ . . . ‘[w]hether or not a firing is in fact discriminatory, members of
[these] groups will have increased leverage in a severance negotiation.’ ”)
(emphasis in original).
7. Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor
Quality of Plaintiffs’ Briefs, Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It
Reflects, 63 EMORY L.J. 59, 62-63 (2013) (demonstrating that plaintiffs’ briefs in
employment discrimination cases are frequently marred by serious substantive
and strategic errors, as well as bad writing).
8. All explanations (including mine) for the low win rate must confront a
serious problem: why do plaintiffs and their (contingent-fee) lawyers persist in
bringing cases they are so likely to lose? Regardless of whether cases are weak,
the rules are unfair, or fact-finders are biased, one would expect that plaintiffs,
and the bar, would stop bringing claims that have such low odds of success. See,
e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1984) (predicting plaintiffs will win fifty percent of
litigated cases if the two parties’ stakes are equal). Steven Shavell argues for a
more general model that allows for asymmetric information between plaintiffs
and defendants. Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is
Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 493-94 (1996). Perhaps the answer is that stakes
are higher for employers than workers. Or maybe the information structure of
employment discrimination disputes favors employers.
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feature of modern employment discrimination law in action.
A substantial fraction of all cases are brought by
“compromised” workers, by which I mean employees whose
own failings could plausibly explain the adverse treatment
they are complaining about, although discriminatory animus
could also explain such treatment. I suggest that this fact
explains a great deal about the shape of legal doctrines and
the dilemmas the law faces in combating employment
discrimination. Nobody is perfect, but in employment
discrimination litigation, the perfect is the enemy of the good.
From a broad policy perspective, the key question is
whether the law is doing a good job punishing the guilty and
compensating victims, while rejecting claims that lack
merit.9 To answer that question requires an a priori
assessment of how much discrimination is “out there,” since
the amount of discrimination constitutes the baseline against
which the performance of the legal system should be judged.
If discrimination is common and plaintiffs rarely win, the
system is not performing well. (The same would be true if
9. Things are even more complicated than this: since most of employment
discrimination litigation alleges discriminatory discharge, the legal system might
still have adverse consequences even if it perfectly sorted good from bad
defendants. By penalizing firing while leaving discriminatory failures to hire
largely unsanctioned, the law could actually encourage discriminatory employers
to hire fewer protected class members in the first instance, so as to avoid potential
liability for future (discriminatory) firings. The significance and welfare
consequences of these dynamic labor demand effects are well beyond the scope of
this Article, although John Donohue and I suggested that such effects are
probably fairly small in the Title VII context. See John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
STAN. L. REV. 983, 997 (1991). For a recent survey of empirical effects of
employment protection legislation (“EPL”), see generally TITO BOERI & JAN VAN
OURS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS (2008) (concluding that EPL
may not bear significant responsibility for the high unemployment rates
characteristic of many European labor markets). On the other hand, most
empirical studies of EPL use very crude proxies for the stringency of these laws
and rely on weak data on labor market performance. As James Heckman and
Carmen Pagés point out, these measurement problems impart a downward bias
to estimates of the laws’ effects. See generally James Heckman & Carmen Pagés,
Law and Employment: Lessons From Latin America and the Caribbean (Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Res.,
Working
Paper
No.
10129
2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10129. According to Heckman and Pagés, better
data leads to much larger estimates of the (negative) effects of firing protection
on hiring and employment. Id. at 6.
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discrimination is rare and plaintiffs frequently won.) That
inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article, however. What can
be said is that from an “internal” perspective, the law of
employment discrimination faces inherent difficulties
dealing with the problems posed by compromised plaintiffs;
unless we are prepared to undertake a much more searching
scrutiny of employment practices than we now do, it will be
very difficult to improve the way the law works. Such
heightened scrutiny may well be desirable, but it will also
entail some significant costs.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I defines what
constitutes a “compromised plaintiff.” Part II shows the
quantitative importance of such plaintiffs among all Title VII
cases using an original data set. Part III offers some
explanations for why compromised plaintiffs are so prevalent
based on a variety of structural features of the law of
employment discrimination. Finally, Part IV explains how
we might change legal rules to take better account of this
phenomenon. Compromised plaintiffs pose many significant
problems for employment discrimination law,10 but my focus
here is on questions of evidence: why is it so difficult for a
compromised plaintiff to prove discrimination, and what, if
anything, we can do about these difficulties.
I. COMPROMISED WORKERS: DEFINITION, EXAMPLES,
CLARIFICATION
A. Example, Definition
For a vivid but not especially unusual example of a
compromised worker, consider the case of Tisa Crawford. 11
Ms. Crawford was a conductor/trainman at the Indiana
Harbor Belt Railroad’s switching yard, where her duties were
to switch trains between tracks, couple and uncouple train
10. Compromised plaintiffs pose special problems for several doctrines in
employment discrimination law, including disparate impact (liability based on
effect rather than intent). For an analysis of compromised plaintiffs in this
context, see generally Peter Siegelman, Contributory Disparate Impact in
Employment Discrimination Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515 (2007).
11. Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., No. 04 C 2977, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10553, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2005), aff’d, 461 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2006).
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cars, and watch for potentially dangerous situations in the
yard. She was fired after receiving eight reprimands during
her first year of work. These included four for unexcused
absences, two for improperly stabilizing a boxcar (one of
these led to a partial derailment), one for not wearing safety
glasses, and one for unsafe riding on a train.12
Ms. Crawford did not contradict the accuracy of her
employer’s records; she seems to have conceded that she did
(or failed to do) everything she was accused of. Rather, her
argument was that white males (she is African-American)
who committed the same (kinds of) offenses were treated
more leniently than she was, which suggests that her
treatment was influenced by her race or sex.13 Whether
similarly-situated white males actually received more
favorable treatment than Ms. Crawford is obviously an
important factual question, one that is at the heart of her
claim to be a victim of discrimination.14 But even if she had
been treated worse than comparable white males, it remains
true that she violated workplace norms and rules in a way
that significantly compromised her claim to being a good
employee. To put it bluntly, she almost certainly deserved to
be fired, even if it also turns out that others who also
deserved to be fired avoided that fate because of their race.15
We can take Ms. Crawford to represent a prototypical
case of a compromised worker: someone whose own conduct,
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id. at *15.
14. The standards for assessing who constitutes a comparable worker are set
by law, so the ultimate question involves both factual and legal issues. In this
case, both the district court and Seventh Circuit concluded that there was little
or no evidence that others who were similarly situated had received more
favorable treatment than Ms. Crawford for similar incidents. Id. Whether or not
that was true is irrelevant for present purposes.
15. That statement would need to be abandoned, of course, if Ms. Crawford had
been denied access to training, or if her bosses had given her more difficult
assignments (to set her up to fail). See id. at *1 (stating Crawford was properly
trained). Context always matters, and what at first seems to be the plaintiff’s
fault may turn out to be endogenous misbehavior that is ultimately attributable
to employer animus, neglect, or prejudice. Id. at *8. But Ms. Crawford apparently
made no such allegations, so it seems unlikely that these were significant issues
of this kind in her case. See id.
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taken in isolation, plausibly justifies the adverse treatment
she received. A substantial fraction of all employment
discrimination litigation is brought by plaintiffs like Ms.
Crawford, people who could plausibly have deserved to be
fired for their misbehavior.16 This seems to have been
especially true for claims of race discrimination.
Despite the importance of “compromised plaintiffs” in
Title VII litigation, the term is not a cognizable legal
category. Since the concept is not yet a term of art, Table 1
presents a series of vignettes that illustrate the kinds of cases
it is meant to cover. To reiterate, the key fact is that in each
of these cases, the plaintiff has done something that might
plausibly justify the adverse treatment he or she is
complaining about, although discrimination could also be an
explanation. There are literally thousands more that could
have been included. Table 1 suggests two important
generalizations, which I will demonstrate in more detail
below.
Description
Officer v. Sedgwick Cty., 226 F. App’x 783 (10th Cir.
2007). Black probation officer fired for several instances
of dereliction of duty: failure to investigate parolees who
made absurd claims, failure to keep proper records, etc.
She asserts white male coworker was demoted rather
than fired for identical misconduct.
Macy v. Hopkins Cty Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 2d 888
(W.D. Ky. 2006). Gym teacher who suffered from postconcussive syndrome after head injury fired after
threatening to kill a group of students and making
inappropriate remarks about their families and sexual
activities. She claims disability discrimination. Her
involvement in thirty-one previous incidents led to her

Outcome
Pl. lost on
summary
judgment.

Pl. lost on
summary
judgment.

16. The background rule governing the employment relationship in most nonunionized contexts is “employment at-will.” See generally Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). This means that an employer
can in theory terminate an employee without cause, for any reason, or no reason
at all, subject to some relatively modest exceptions. A compromised worker cannot
therefore be defined merely as someone their employer is legally entitled to fire
(or discipline, etc.). Rather, “compromised” means someone the employer is
justified in firing, based on the seriousness of the employee’s misconduct.
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conviction on nine counts of terroristic threatening. She
asserts that another teacher, speaking to a teacher’s aide,
said that the she would “kill” a student if the aide did not
remove the student from the room, but the other teacher
was not fired.
Torlowei v. Target, No. 02-933 (MJD/JGL), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1475, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2004). Nigerian
collections worker was mistakenly assigned delinquent
customer who had already worked out payment plan with
Pl. lost on
another collector. Pl. deliberately re-entered data into the
summary
system to make it appear that she, rather than earlier
judgment.
collector, deserved credit for arrangement with customer.
She was fired, but alleges race discrimination and
suggests several others, “all whites,” were not fired after
similar behavior.
Scott v. Genuine Parts Co., No. IP00-866 C-T/K, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1698, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2002).
During interview for driver position, Pl. disclosed her
criminal record (including three felony convictions many Pl. lost on
years previously, for selling drugs) and explained she had summary
been terminated from most recent job for failing drug judgment.
test. When Def. did not offer her a job, she claimed sex
discrimination, based on the assertion that Def. had
previously hired a male with felony record.
Baker v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., No. 97 C
7075, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 988, at *1 (N.D. Ill Jan. 25,
2001). Black caseworker with long record of poor
performance evaluations (including failure to meet
twenty of thirty-six objectives set for him) was fired after
Pl. lost on
he put an abused and disabled child in the home of a
summary
neighbor of hers, without required background checks;
judgment.
made no effort to ensure safety of the child postplacement; and possibly forged supervisor’s signature on
write up of the case. He asserts race and sex
discrimination and claims that two white women did
similar things and were not fired.
Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, No. 1:06CV-213, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94175, at *1 (E.D. Tenn.
Pl. won in
Dec. 20, 2007). Black worker was discharged by public
bench trial;
works department after admitting he set off firecrackers
verdict
while on the job. Credible witnesses testified that white
sustained on
employees used firecrackers, sometimes with supervisors
appeal.
or managers present, without being reported or
disciplined.
Table 1: Examples of Compromised Workers
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First, all of the plaintiffs performed badly, violating
workplace norms or rules in ways that were typically quite
significant.
Second, most of the cases involve an allegation that the
plaintiffs were treated less-favorably than others who
performed equally badly.17 The comparative misfeasance
element is not part of my definition of a compromised worker,
however, because it is possible to make a claim of
discrimination without this kind of comparative evidence. X
may assert she was the victim of discrimination without
comparing herself to someone who was treated more
favorably, relying instead on “direct evidence” such as racist
or sexist remarks made by the employer, rather than
comparative evidence. Nevertheless, compromised plaintiffs
often do rely on comparative evidence, and as we will see, this
has important implications for how courts treat their claims.
B. Clarifications, Caveats
1. Non-Compromised Workers Also Experience
Discrimination
Although my focus is on compromised workers, there is
abundant social science evidence suggesting that even
exemplary workers face discrimination in pay, hiring,
harassment, and other aspects of employment.18 I do not
17. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 9, at 1012 (noticing this issue, but
failing to analyze it in depth); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by
Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 735 (2011) (offering a more theoretical take on
comparator liability); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 192-94 (2009) (laying out
the doctrines governing the use of comparators, stressing the judicial hostility to
that mode of proof). The issue of comparator liability is discussed infra p. 595.
18. See, e.g., MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED,
OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991); Marianne
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004). But see James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, The
Urban Institute Audit Studies: Their Methods and Findings, in CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 187-227
(Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) (cautioning against some
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mean to deny the existence of this kind of discrimination; but
I do want to suggest that at least in some areas of the law, it
is less important as a source of litigation than most people
believe. Regardless of the quantitative importance of
discrimination against the “exemplary,” the legal rules
designed to detect and redress their problems are often illsuited to protect the compromised. That makes it important
to study the special problems posed by efforts to protect the
compromised.
2. Compromised Workers Can Be Victims of
Discrimination
It is also important to emphasize that workers such as
Ms. Crawford can be legitimate victims of discrimination,
despite their compromised status. The law has long
recognized that compromised workers are victims of
discrimination if they are treated worse than other (similarly
compromised) workers because of their race, sex, age, or
other protected class status. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation,19 the Supreme Court made it clear that Title
VII liability extended to the compromised. The plaintiff in
McDonald was a white man who was fired for stealing sixty
one-gallon cans of antifreeze from his employer.20 McDonald
did not deny that he had stolen the antifreeze, but he did
assert that black co-thieves were not similarly disciplined.
One of the employer’s arguments in response was that the

inferences from audit data). An archetypal example of discrimination against the
exemplary was the 1939 refusal of the Daughters of the American Revolution to
allow Marian Anderson to sing at Constitution Hall. Conductor Arturo Toscanini
said Anderson had a voice that “comes around once in a hundred years.” But she
was denied access to the venue solely because she was black. Instead, Anderson
sang on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial at the invitation of Eleanor Roosevelt.
See Susan Stamberg, Denied A Stage, She Sang For A Nation, NPR (Apr. 9, 2014),
www.npr.org/2014/04/09/298760473/denied-a-stage-she-sang-for-a-nation.
To
view Anderson’s moving rendition of “My Country ‘Tis of Thee” at the Lincoln
Memorial, see Lincoln Memorial and My Country ‘Tis of Thee, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpYg_8pU_cQ (last viewed Feb. 29, 2016).
19. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
20. Id. at 276.
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anti-discrimination law does not protect those guilty of theft.
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall concluded:
We cannot accept . . . [the] argument that the principles of [Title
VII] are inapplicable where the discharge was based . . . on
participation in serious misconduct or crime directed against the
employer. [Title VII] prohibits all racial discrimination in
employment, without exception for any group of particular
employees, and while crime or other misconduct may be a
legitimate basis for discharge, it is hardly one for racial
discrimination . . . . [An act may justify firing,] but this does not
diminish the illogic in retaining guilty employees of one color while
discharging those of another . . . .21

Of course, some claims of discrimination made by
compromised workers (and others) may be “illegitimate” or
without merit. But “unmeritorious” and “compromised” are
logically distinct categories. “Compromised” means that the
plaintiff did something wrong; “illegitimate” (in the sense of
someone who is bringing baseless litigation, perhaps to
extract a settlement from their employer, without actually
being a victim of discrimination) means that the employer did
nothing wrong.
In sum, if white boxcar-derailers are rarely disciplined,
while Ms. Crawford or other African-American boxcarderailers are fired, the black workers are clearly victims of
discrimination who are, and should be, entitled to the
protection of our employment discrimination laws.22 It is
unequal and unfair treatment based on race or sex for an
employer to fire Ms. Crawford while allowing equally bad
white male miscreants to remain on the job. It is also
obviously illegal. But, as I argue below, the formal ban on
discrimination against the compromised conceals several key
problems entailed by the enforcement of the law in this area.
Here are two: compromised plaintiffs often seem less
sympathetic than the “perfect” worker who is a victim of
discrimination despite having done nothing wrong. And
21. Id. at 283-84 (emphasis in original).
22. See, e.g., Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, No. 1:06-CV-213,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94175, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007) (alleging a black
worker discharged after setting off firecrackers on the job was the subject of
discrimination because white employees who also “used firecrackers, sometimes
with supervisors or managers present, [were not] reported or disciplined . . . .”).

576

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

sorting out an employer’s motive for the adverse treatment
the plaintiff is complaining about requires careful factual
inquiry that courts seem reluctant to undertake.
Before turning to those problems, however, I first
demonstrate the numerical importance of compromised
plaintiffs in the overall employment discrimination caseload,
and suggest why they are so common.
II. ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPROMISED
PLAINTIFFS
A. A Priori
Compromised plaintiffs almost have to be important
sources of employment discrimination litigation because so
much litigation is about firing, and so many of the fired are
compromised.
1. Most Discrimination Plaintiffs Allege
Discriminatory Firing
Data on the composition of claims reveal that since the
early 1970s, a majority of complaints have alleged firing
discrimination. In our survey of employment discrimination
complaints filed in federal district courts in seven cities
around the country over the years 1970 through 1989, John
Donohue and I found that roughly 60% of filed complaints
alleged discriminatory discharge as one of their bases of
discrimination.23 Recent replication and extension of this
work by Laura Beth Nielson and Robert L. Nelson, based on
data through 2006, concludes that firings continue to
generate roughly 60% of all employment discrimination
complaints filed in federal district courts.24
Virtually all federal employment discrimination
plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
23. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991).
24. See LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., CONTESTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION, 1987-2006, at 17 (2008).

IN
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before being allowed to proceed to a hearing in federal court.
Over the period from 2001-2007, slightly over 50% of all
charges alleged discharge as an issue.25 Discharge cases
constituted roughly the same ratio, 48% of district court
employment discrimination cases in my random sample of
363 federal district court opinions (published and
unpublished).26
2. Employers Rarely Fire for No Reason
True, the at-will employment rule gives employers in
many states the right to fire someone for almost any reason,
or no reason at all. But while people are sometimes fired to
prevent their pension from vesting,27 or to make room for the
boss’ brother,28 or because they complained about being
harassed, most firings seem to have at least a plausible link
to deficiencies of the employee him- or herself.29 Since firing
cases are so numerous among employment discrimination
claims, it follows that a very substantial fraction of claims
will inevitably be brought by compromised workers. The data
described below support this intuition.

25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2009) (describing the required procedures). Since
the EEOC keeps better records than the federal courts do, EEOC data can shed
light on the types of discrimination plaintiffs are complaining about. Sadly, EEOC
annual reports no longer give breakdowns of charges filed by “issue.” However,
an email from EEOC Staffer Barbara Robinson confirms that between FY 2001
and FY 2007, there were 560,395 charges, of which 282,601 (50.4%) alleged
discharge as an issue. See E-mail from Barbara Robinson, Staffer, Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n (on file with author).
26. For a description of the survey, see infra app. pp. 606-07.
27. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 604 (1993) (arguing the worker
was fired to avoid pension vesting).
28. Miller v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, No. 07-CV-1368(JMR/FLN), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26390, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2008) (arguing the plaintiff was
fired and replaced by her boss’ brother, although her own poor performance was
also an issue).
29. In unionized contexts, union activism represents another obvious
motivation for discharge.
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3. Immutable Characteristics and Changes in
Employment Status
Moreover, race and sex are largely immutable
characteristics, so they are typically incapable of explaining
firing by themselves.30 Simply put, firing constitutes a change
in status (from employed to no longer employed). One can
only explain a change in status with an explanatory variable
that, itself, has changed. Since race and sex rarely change,
they cannot, on their own, suffice to explain why a plaintiff
changed from employed to fired. Of course, that does not
mean that race and gender cannot be causes of firing, only
that they must almost always be causes in combination with
something else. That something else typically consists of the
employee’s compromised status; that is, of their having done
something that might plausibly get them fired.
B. Direct Evidence
1. Limitations
Since the term “compromised plaintiff” is not (yet) a
cognizable legal category, there is no simple way to
determine the prevalence or importance of such plaintiffs
among all potential employment discrimination grievances.
30. There are rare counter-examples in which a firing is motivated by a
perceived “change” in race or sex. For instance, there are a few cases in which a
plaintiff’s race is initially unclear, the employer hires her believing she is white,
and then fires her upon discovering she is actually black. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (alleging that employer
fired plaintiff upon discovering that she was African-American instead of
Caucasian). Plaintiffs sometimes allege that they were disciplined after they
married someone of another race. See, e.g., Pope v. Hickory, 541 F. Supp. 872, 878
(W.D.N.C. 1981) (concerning an African-American alleging he was discharged
because of his marriage to a white woman). In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff was male when hired, underwent a sex
change operation, and then alleged she was fired because she was a woman (or
because she had changed sex). Id. at 1082-83. Even when race or national origin
remains constant over time, their valence can nevertheless change dramatically.
For example, in Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2008), the
plaintiff had apparently received strong performance reviews, but was
terminated after publicly defending Muslims and Islam in the wake of the 9/11
attacks. Id. at 523-25. However, these kinds of fact patterns are highly unusual.
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Ideally, one might like to have independent measures at each
level of the socio-legal “dispute pyramid,” which traces the
evolution of a potential dispute from its earliest stage until it
matriculates to a case filed in federal court. Abundant sociolegal research has established that there is a massive
winnowing of disputes at each stage of the pyramid.31 Thus,
cases with published district court opinions, at the top of the
pyramid, are only a tiny and not necessarily representative
sample of the universe of employment discrimination
grievances at the bottom.32
Unfortunately, we lack good data on what happens at the
lower levels of the pyramid. The scant survey data on the
prevalence of employment discrimination are based on
inherently unreliable self-reports, and provide little, if any,
context for what people actually perceive to be acts of
discrimination. The EEOC does collect minimal data on the
charges of discrimination it receives,33 but without access to
its confidential charge files, there is insufficient factual detail
to make a plausible assessment of whether a charging party
was “compromised” under my definition. A recent American
Bar Foundation project coded more than 1000 filed
employment discrimination cases, but also failed to provide
enough detail to assess the plaintiff’s status.34

31. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631-36, 64951 (1980-81); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming
System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 680-82. But see Sachin S. Pandya & Peter
Siegelman, Underclaiming and Overclaiming, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 836, 843-44
(2013) (suggesting some weaknesses in the Dispute Pyramid model).
32. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip:
A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases,
24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1133-35 (1990) (arguing cases with published opinions
are unrepresentative of the filed cases).
33. Essentially all employment discrimination claims must proceed through
the EEOC in order to obtain a right to sue letter that is a prerequisite for
successful suit (the major exception is cases filed exclusively under section 1981
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which covers race discrimination, but which is
seldom used on its own).
34. See NIELSEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 29.

580

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Hence, there is little choice but to use judicial opinions to
study the prevalence of compromised plaintiffs; these
opinions are the only source that provides the rich factual
background needed to make the determination of who is
actually compromised. Moreover, on the available evidence,
there is not much reason to think that the cases with
published opinions are substantially different from filed
cases or charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC. For
example, the composition of disputes by basis of
discrimination (race, sex, etc.) or by type of discrimination
(hiring, firing, etc.) at these levels of the pyramid are actually
quite similar.35 Accordingly, I proceed on the assumption that
judicial opinions reflect the run of cases filed for the purposes
of this study.
Lexis or Westlaw searches cannot be designed to shed
much light on the problem directly because “compromised
plaintiff” is a “factual,” rather than a legal category, and
cannot be reduced to a simple search protocol. Hence, I rely
on my own survey of judicial opinions (as well as two other
published studies). It is important to be cautious here,
because published opinions offer a distorted window through
which to view the underlying factual realities. Like any other
narrator, judges invariably select which facts to present and
how they are framed. It is certainly possible that losing
plaintiffs are portrayed as more “compromised” (and hence,
less attractive) than they might appear under some
alternative narrative. This is true even when the judge is
dismissing a case on a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and is obliged to consider the record as a whole in
the light most favorable to, and draw all reasonable
inferences that favor, the non-moving party.36 I try to take
account of this problem in the analysis that follows by being
especially careful in the coding of what constitutes a
compromised plaintiff (see Appendix), but I acknowledge that

35. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 9.
36. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must read all facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Terrell v. Childers, 920 F.
Supp. 854, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 254 (1986)).
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poses an obstacle to obtaining a clear picture of what is going
on.
2. District Court Opinions Study
To ascertain the prevalence of compromised plaintiffs, I
conducted my own random sample of opinions in 641 federal
district court Title VII employment discrimination cases.37
Table 2 presents a basic overview of the frequency of
compromised plaintiffs in this data set.
Status

Number

Percentage of
Total

Compromised

124

34.2

Possibly
Compromised

131

36.1

Not Compromised

108

29.7

Total

363

100.0

Table 2: Distribution of Title VII Opinions by Compromised Status
(for opinions with usable information)
Note: Starting from a sample universe of 641 opinions, excludes 237 opinions that were
not employment discrimination cases or for which no information about the plaintiff’s status
was available (e.g., a purely procedural opinion). Also excludes 43 opinions with more than
1 plaintiff.

The key point that emerges from Table 2 is simply that
compromised plaintiffs constitute a substantial fraction of all
employment discrimination cases. Just under one-third of all
opinions involved a plaintiff who was clearly compromised;
roughly one-third of involved plaintiffs who were possibly
compromised, meaning cases in which the plaintiff may have
done something wrong, but facts were in dispute.38 Another
one-third of plaintiffs were clearly not compromised. Put
another way, roughly two-thirds of the useable opinions
37. Details (including coding of “compromised” status) are available in the
Appendix. The sample included published and unpublished opinions for the
period from 1965 through 2007. See infra app. pp. 606-07.
38. I tried to be as conservative as possible in coding this variable.

582

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

involved plaintiffs who had clearly or possibly done
something wrong enough to justify the adverse treatment
they received.
Table 3 further breaks down the opinions by type of
discrimination being alleged, focusing on firing. Firing claims
are by far the most common, constituting just under one-half
of the “useable” opinions (that is, those that provided enough
information
about
the
underlying
employment
discrimination dispute, as opposed to procedural issues, legal
fees, etc.). What emerges from Table 3 is that allegations of
firing discrimination almost always entail compromised or
possibly-compromised plaintiffs: only 10 out of 175 (5.7%)
firing opinions involved non-compromised (“exemplary”)
plaintiffs.39 By contrast, more than half of the non-firing cases
involved exemplary plaintiffs.40 A substantial share of the
cases in my sample thus involve compromised plaintiffs.
Compromised

χ2

Possibly
NonCompromised Compromised

Total

Firing

89

76

10

175

Column %

71.8%

58.0%

9.3%

48.2%

Row %

50.9%

43.4%

5.7%

100%

Non-firing

35

55

98

188

Column %

28.2%

42.0%

90.7%

51.8%

Row %

18.6%

29.3%

52.1%

100%

Total

124

131

108

363

Column %

100%

100%

100%

100%

Row %

34.2%

36.1%

29.8%

100%

(2, N = 363) = 98.2, p < 0.01

Table 3: Number and Distribution of Title VII Opinions by Compromised Status
and Type of Discrimination
Source: Author’s survey of employment discrimination opinions, detailed in Appendix.
Note: χ2 test for independence of compromised status and type of discrimination across all
3 columns and both rows, 2 d.f.; alternative specifications (omitting the “possibly
compromised” column altogether, or combining the “compromised” and “possiblycompromised”) with 1 d.f. yield essentially identical results.

39. These were cases where, for example, the plaintiff was fired to prevent his
receiving a bonus, or because the plaintiff (a white woman) had married a black
man.
40. Of the non-firing cases, harassment was by far the next most common type
of discrimination, with 67 cases. Of these, fully 75% were brought by were
“exemplary” plaintiffs.
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Table 4 looks at compromised status by basis of
discrimination (race, etc.), rather than by type of
discrimination. Just over half of all cases allege race
discrimination, and of these, roughly three-fourths are
compromised or possibly compromised.
Compromised

Possibly
Compromised

NonCompromised

Total

Race

75

71

48

194

Column %

60.5%

54.2%

44.4%

53.4%

Row %

38.7%

36.6%

24.7%

100%

Non-Race

49

60

60

169

Column %

39.5%

45.8%

55.6%

46.6%

Row %

29.0%

35.5%

35.5%

100%

Total

124

131

108

363

Column %

100%

100%

100%

100%

Row %

34.2%

36.1%

29.8%

100%

χ2 (2,

N = 363) = 6.0, p < 0.01

Table 4: Number and Distribution of Opinions by Compromised Status and Basis
of Discrimination
Source: Author’s survey of employment discrimination opinions, detailed in Appendix.
Note: χ2 test for independence of compromised status and race across all 3 columns and
both rows, 2 d.f. Alternative specifications (omitting the “possibly compromised” column
altogether, or combining the “compromised” and “possibly-compromised”) with 1 d.f. yield
essentially identical results.

3. Other Evidence
My claim about the prevalence of employment
discrimination cases brought by compromised workers is
supported by the work of labor market sociologists. Craig
Zwerling and Hillary Silver followed roughly 2000
probationary employees of the U.S. Postal Service in a single
city between 1986 and 1989 in an effort to understand who
would be fired.41 Their careful review of the personnel files
revealed that there were apparently “no cases of

41. Craig Zwerling & Hilary Silver, Race and Job Dismissals in a Federal
Bureaucracy, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 651, 653-54 (1992).
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inappropriate firings,” for either black or white workers. 42
This implies that any plaintiffs who might have materialized
from this group of fired employees would had to have been
“compromised” under my definition.43
More recently, Vincent Roscigno surveyed roughly
60,000 employment discrimination claims filed with the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission, restricting his sample to cases
where either the Commission determined there was probable
cause to believe that discrimination had occurred or the
parties had reached a settlement (payment to the charging
party).44 His study led him to conclude that “sanctions for
supposedly poor work performance are rampant throughout
the body of case materials.”45 This is precisely the
compromised worker phenomenon.
4. Evidence from Other Areas of Civil Rights
A similar pattern of “at fault” or “non-exemplary” victims
emerges in other equal protection contexts. For example,
42. Id. at 658. Importantly, they also found that blacks were more than twice
as likely to be fired as whites, controlling for the information the employer
apparently used in making firing decisions. Id. at 651.
43. We do not know if any of those who were fired actually sued, however. The
authors suggested, but could not prove, that although all of those who were fired
deserved to be, “there may [have been] white employees who were not fired for
similar reasons.” Id. at 658 (emphasis added). Of course, this is precisely the
plaintiff’s argument in a substantial fraction of discrimination-based cases.
Zwerling and Silver could not reject unobserved heterogeneity by race as a
possible source of differential outcomes, however. Thus, the data were not
dispositive on the question of discrimination, although the detailed personnel
records and the two-to-one firing ratio do seem suggestive.
44. VINCENT J. ROSCIGNO, THE FACE OF DISCRIMINATION: HOW RACE
GENDER IMPACT WORK AND HOME LIVES 15 (2007).

AND

45. Id. at 30. Roscigno goes on to state that “such termination is problematic
and discriminatory when the rationale and justifications are differentially
applied.” Id. Roscigno also confirms the importance of firing discrimination
claims, concluding that “expulsion” (discriminatory discharge) was at issue in
approximately two-thirds of all charges of discrimination filed against private
employers in Ohio. Id. at 27, fig. 1.3. Civil service employees have much greater
job security than most workers in the private sector. Hence, gross firing rates,
and opportunities for discriminatory discharge, are typically much lower for
public employees, consistent with Roscigno’s finding that firing is not an
important source of discrimination complaints for public sector workers. Id.
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consider claims of selective prosecution, in which a criminal
defendant seeks to establish that “similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.”46 Just as
a compromised employment discrimination plaintiff has done
something wrong, but was treated worse than others who
behaved equally badly, a victim of selective prosecution
asserts that they are the victim of discrimination by virtue of
the prosecutor’s failure to treat others as harshly as they
were treated. Such claims are difficult to prove (especially
given criminal defendants’ limited power to obtain
information about prosecutorial motives), and are thus made
relatively rarely. Moreover, the actors involved—criminal
defendants/government prosecutors—are obviously quite
different from the employment context. But while the
existence of selective prosecution cases is obviously not proof
of the importance of compromised plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases, there is a structural analogy that
suggests the problem is not unique to employment.
Sadly, what seems to be true of firing (once dubbed “‘the
industrial equivalent of capital punishment’”47) is also true of
actual capital punishment itself. For example, a thorough
statistical investigation of the death penalty in Connecticut
recently revealed that while those few defendants who were
sentenced to death were probably guilty of horrible murders,
many whites (and fewer blacks) who were also guilty of such
murders escaped with lesser sentences.48
Compromised plaintiffs also cropped up frequently in an
earlier study of public accommodations race discrimination
46. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (involving plaintiffs
charged with selling crack cocaine who did not deny their guilt, but asserted that
they were selected for prosecution because they were black).
47. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 421 (1981) (quoting M.
Jay Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Union’s Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 IND.
L.J. 472, 481 (1975)).
48. See Rick Green, Study Shows Scales Of Justice Askew When It Comes to
Death Penalty: The Worst Killers Very Frequently Do Not Get It, HARTFORD
COURANT (Jan. 12, 2012) http://articles.courant.com/2012-01-12/news/hc-greendeath-penalty-0113-20120112_1_capital-felony-death-eligible-killers-of-whitevictims; see also John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut
Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and
Geographic Disparities? 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 637, 640 (2014).
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cases.49 Roughly one-third of these cases did not allege an
outright refusal to serve, although such refusals were also
common. Instead, a typical fact pattern often began with a
dispute that occurred in the course of an ordinary
transaction; this then precipitated the adverse race-based
treatment being complained about. For a substantial fraction
of these cases, in other words, race seemed to be combining
with some less-than-exemplary behavior to produce the
unfavorable outcome, although it is frequently difficult to
know whether the non-exemplary conduct was actually
endogenous to the situation.50
C. Conclusion
Compromised or non-exemplary plaintiffs bring a
substantial share of all employment discrimination cases.
Most firing cases—as many as 70%—involve compromised
workers, and such workers also figure in disputes over
promotion, retaliation, and even hiring, albeit less
frequently. Some types of discrimination—notably
harassment claims—are much less likely to involve
compromised workers. Compromised workers are most
common in race discrimination claims.
III. WHY ARE THERE SO MANY COMPROMISED PLAINTIFFS?
Why is so much of employment discrimination litigation
brought by compromised plaintiffs and why has the
phenomenon virtually escaped the notice of legal academics
and judges? There are two types of explanations: “structural”
and “psychological.” Although this distinction is somewhat
artificial, it helps illuminate the failure in the law.

49. See generally Peter Siegelman, Racial Discrimination in “Everyday”
Commercial Transactions: What Do We Know, What Do We Need to Know, and
How Can We Find Out?, in A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING 69 (Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner eds.,
1998).
50. See, e.g., Alexis v. McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 345-46 (1st
Cir. 1995) (involving a black patron forcibly ejected from restaurant because of
earlier dispute with cashier); Perkins v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 282, 28384 (D.D.C. 1996) (involving a dispute over whether room rate included breakfast
which led to confrontation between plaintiffs and hotel staff).
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A. Structural Reasons
The asymmetric power relationships that are endemic in
most employment situations explain some of the prevalence
of compromised plaintiffs in employment discrimination
cases.
1. Employer Power
All the major employment discrimination statutes
prohibit retaliation against workers who complain about
illegal conduct by their employers or participate in
investigations of such conduct.51 But employers have
countless ways of making life difficult for employees they do
not like, many of which will slip under the protection afforded
by anti-retaliation laws. It follows that employment
discrimination law offers relatively little protection against
mistreatment that occurs while a worker is on the job: the
potential for retaliation is simply too large to make it
worthwhile for most plaintiffs to litigate against their
current employers. And indeed, based on our survey of filed
complaints, John Donohue and I concluded that “only 10
percent of suits by non-government employees are brought by
plaintiffs who were working for the defendant at the time the
suit was filed.”52 If currently-employed workers do not
usually sue, then those who are no longer working for the
defendant/employer will be the primary sources of litigation.
51. See, e.g., Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). The antiretaliation provisions of Title VII are found in § 704, which defines retaliation as
an entirely separate basis for liability, apart from the validity of the underlying
claim of discrimination. A successful retaliation claim requires the plaintiff to
show that the employer was engaging in practices that the plaintiff reasonably
believed were unlawful under Title VII, that the plaintiff complained about these
practices or participated in opposition to them, and that there was a causal nexus
between his or her behavior and some adverse employment action taken by the
employer against the plaintiff. See id.; see also CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553
U.S. 442 (2008) (holding that § 1981, although containing no explicit antiretaliation provision, nevertheless encompasses claims of retaliation stemming
from an underlying complaint based on race).
52. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 9, at 1031. We found that public
employees, who have substantially greater job protection, are considerably more
likely to remain on the job while suing their employer.

588

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Some of those will be workers who have quit, but many will
have been fired, and many of those will be compromised, for
reasons discussed earlier.
2. Economics
One reason why compromised workers bring such a large
share of all employment discrimination suits is that they are
probably more likely to experience discrimination than their
non-compromised counterparts. The epigraph from Judge
Posner gives an economic rationale for why this should be so:
the best workers are less likely to be discriminated against
because the opportunity costs of firing (or failing to hire)
them are higher.53 Moreover, exemplary workers will
probably find it easier to obtain alternative postdiscrimination employment, reducing their incentive to
initiate litigation relative to compromised workers.54
B. Psychological Reasons
1. “Aversive Racism”—Discrimination Against the
Non-Exemplary
Evidence from social psychology supports a somewhat
different explanation for the importance of compromised
workers among all employment discrimination plaintiffs.
According to the infelicitously-named theory of “aversive
53. This theory also seems to suggest that the worst workers are unlikely to be
discriminated against for much the same reason. Consider a compromised
minority worker X, who is fired. Firing X is presumably low-cost to the employer,
precisely because X’s productivity was low. But in order for the firing to be
discriminatory, it would need to be the case that X’s white counterpart, Y, was
retained, despite being compromised in the same way X was, since it is only the
retention of Y while firing X that makes the firing discriminatory. But retaining
Y is decidedly not costless to the employer: failing to fire a bad employee will often
be even more costly than failing to hire a good one.
54. See generally John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and
Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709 (1993) (showing that the volume of employment
discrimination lawsuits responds to the business cycle because backpay damages
are larger during recessions, giving fired workers a greater incentive to sue when
the unemployment rate is high).
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racism,”55 many whites, even those who are in fact prejudiced,
are actually reluctant to be labeled as racists, or to think of
themselves as such. To maintain this self-image, despite
unconscious beliefs to the contrary, aversive racists are
willing to treat “exemplary” members of minority groups as
their equals. After all, an open display of hostility towards all
African-Americans would be incompatible with an unbiased
attitude, clearly marking one as a racist. But racial hostility
towards “non-exemplary” blacks can be disguised (both to
one’s self and others) as justified hostility for the nonexemplary, rather than unjustified discriminatory animus.
In simplified terms, an aversive racist employer might treat
an exemplary African-American as though he were white,
but would be much harsher on a compromised AfricanAmerican employee than on a similarly compromised white
worker. As the two leading aversive racism scholars put it:
[D]iscrimination will occur when an aversive racist can justify or
rationalize a negative response on the basis of some factor other
than race. Under these circumstances, aversive racists may engage
in behaviors that ultimately harm blacks but in ways that allow
whites to maintain their self-image as non-prejudiced and that
insulate them from recognizing that their behavior is not color
blind.56

Gaertner and Dovidio’s experimental results suggest
that this pattern is quite common.57 And the behavior
strongly resonates with at least some of the cases: when
55. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism,
in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM: THEORY AND RESEARCH 61-89 (John F.
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, eds., 1986). There is by now a fairly substantial
body of experimental evidence supporting this theory. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio
& Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, in 36 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1-43 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2004).
56. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 55, at 8.
57. There are dozens of experiments testing the theory. For a relatively recent
survey, see id. Here is one example: college students were given the task of hiring
someone for a peer counseling job. The applicants’ qualifications were
manipulated to be either strong, intermediate, or very weak. When candidates’
credentials were either strong or very weak, subjects showed no preference for
white over black applicants. “However, when candidates’ qualifications for the
position were less obvious . . . white participants recommended the black
candidate significantly less often than the white candidate with exactly the same
credentials.” Id. at 16.
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white workers set off firecrackers on the job in defiance of
employer rules, their conduct gets excused as the result of
stress, or of high spirits. But similar behavior by a black
employee is treated more harshly: “a rule’s a rule,” “we can’t
let people get away with that kind of thing,” and so on.58
Discrimination against the compromised thus seems both
psychologically plausible and consistent with familiar
cultural stories.59
2. Cognitive Dissonance/Self-Serving Bias
Even if the non-exemplary are actually more likely to
experience discrimination, there are also non-discriminatory
explanations for why the compromised are likely to sue.60
One is self-serving bias, which has been well-described and
documented by psychologists. It refers to a tendency to see
things in a light most favorable to one’s self.61 Compromised
workers may often feel that they really performed no worse
58. Employers often use such excuses to justify their actions. See, e.g., Madden
v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, No. 1:06-CV-213, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94175 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007).
59. It also may help explain why this kind of litigation is often so bitter:
whether correct or not, plaintiffs compare themselves to their comparator and see
evidence of discrimination. Conversely, employers compare plaintiffs to an
absolute standard (“She derailed boxcars, so of course we fired her”) and see none.
60. Ward Farnsworth suggests that “[w]hat we know about self-serving
biases . . . suggests that laws forbidding employment discrimination are likely to
generate unusually high numbers of spurious claims and defenses, and that it will
be relatively difficult to find a view of the matter on which the parties can agree.
Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 567, 594 (2003) (emphasis added). Farnsworth goes on to suggest that
“interpos[ing] a measure of independent judgment between the plaintiff and the
courts” can help reduce self-serving bias, and cites the EEOC as an example of
this phenomenon, designed, perhaps, to “take away from the employee the power
to decide whether his own perception that he was fired for bad reasons should be
turned into legal costs for the employer.” Id. at 594-95. Don Moore and Deborah
Small point out some subtleties in self-serving comparisons, and suggest that
familiarity with the task increases the size of the self-serving bias effect:
presumably most people are quite familiar with their own jobs. Don A. Moore &
Deborah A. Small, Error and Bias in Comparative Judgment: On Being Both
Better and Worse Than We Think We Are, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 972
passim (2007); see Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the
Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213 (1975).
61. Miller & Ross, supra note 60, at 213.
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than their comparators, even when an objective third party
would conclude otherwise. An (unconscious) attribution of
discriminatory motive is a way to reconcile one’s beliefs about
one’s relative performance with the employer’s less-favorable
evaluation of that performance.
Of course, employers are also likely to suffer from selfserving bias, and especially so when the employee has done
something wrong. So, the bottom line here is not that
plaintiffs are bringing a lot of unjustified employment
discrimination claims; it is simply that self-serving bias
offers a possible explanation for some of the claims that are
brought.
C. Conclusion
Given that discrimination against the compromised is
clearly illegal, one might be tempted to ask what difference
any of this makes. Employment discrimination law already
forbids the disparate treatment of black and white boxcarderailers, as indeed it must. Compromised plaintiffs are
clearly protected by law on the same basis as those who are
entirely virtuous,62 so don’t existing legal rules already
handle the problems posed by compromised workers?
Formally, the answer is “yes,” and in that sense the category
is of no legal relevance: compromised workers are entitled to
the same protections as the non-compromised. But in
practice, the answer looks very different.
IV. HOW COMPROMISED PLAINTIFFS SHAPE WHAT THE LAW
CAN DO, AND VICE-VERSA
Compromised plaintiffs have a difficult time proving that
they are victims of discrimination because—by definition—
their employer will always have a plausible story about why
they received the adverse treatment they are complaining
about: “they deserved it.” Put another way, among the
compromised, distinguishing between actual victims of
discrimination and non-victims is extraordinarily difficult
because there is a good reason to fire the compromised
plaintiff. Plaintiffs cannot win more often unless courts are
62. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281-85 (1976).
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prepared to give much more intense and intrusive scrutiny to
employment practices and particular circumstances than
they now do. Such scrutiny would entail tradeoffs of a kind
that employment discrimination law has not yet explicitly
confronted.
A. What Constitutes Evidence of Discrimination Against the
Compromised?
In order to prove that they were victims of
discrimination, compromised plaintiffs potentially have
available to them one or more of the following types of
evidence:63
1. Direct evidence of discriminatory motive (verbal
remarks such as sexist/racist language or physical behavior
that tend to indicate a discriminatory frame of mind);
2. Comparison evidence (the fact that employees of the
other race/sex were treated more favorably for
identical/similar misdeeds); and
3. “Offense severity” or “proportionality” evidence
(linking the degree of misbehavior and the severity of the
sanction imposed).
A schematic representation is provided by Figure 1. Each
axis is drawn so that the plaintiff’s case gets stronger as we
move further from the origin; there is presumably a threedimensional surface in this space beyond which plaintiffs
should have enough evidence to convince a trier of fact that
they were victims of discrimination.

63. Claims of discrimination are established through a framework first
articulated by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which
governs the order of proof in employment discrimination cases. The details are
fortunately irrelevant for the present analysis.

2016]

THE COMPROMISED WORKER

593

Offense Severity

Stealing
Paper Clips

Exactly Compar able
Non- Pr otected
Employee Treated
Better for Same
Conduct

Strength of
Compar ative Evidence

Repeated
Absence

Unique
Individual
Murder
Stray Remar ks Made
Several Yrs Previously

Super visor Explains
Counterfactual

Str ength of
“Direct” Evidence

Figure 1: Types of Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases

1. Direct Evidence
Consider “direct” evidence first. Such evidence usually
takes the form of verbal remarks that suggest a racial or sexbased motive for an adverse employment action. For
example, an employer might say, “I’m going to fire your black
ass,” in the context of a workplace dispute.64 Slurs and
epithets—unfortunately, often much worse than this
example—are not uncommon in employment discrimination
litigation. Injurious by themselves, they also suggest the
presence of discriminatory animus on the part of the
employer. Of course, evidence can sometimes be even more
“direct” than this comment. Consider this (unusual) remark
in a hiring case, in which the defendant admitted that the
64. Parker v. Rockford Park Dist., No, 99 C 50073, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1192,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2001) (noting that upon discovering the plaintiff’s
misconduct, the supervisor said, “I ought to fire your black ass,” after which the
plaintiff was ultimately fired).
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plaintiff’s protected-class status was a but-for cause of his
rejection:
[Plaintiff] asked [his interviewer] if age was a factor in the decision
not to hire him . . . . [He] responded that “it didn’t help you any”
and [that] “I would understand–if you were 20 years younger, I
would understand your nervousness and I would have selected you,
yet a man your age, with your experience, I couldn’t understand you
being nervous.”65

Compromised plaintiffs typically have a difficult time
prevailing based on direct evidence, especially because, by
definition, they have done something wrong enough to
plausibly warrant the adverse employment action they are
complaining about.66 That is, judges will often conclude that
the plaintiffs’ direct evidence is insufficient to outweigh the
employers’ “legitimate” reasons for the adverse treatment—
typically, firing—being complained of. Not surprisingly,
therefore, only about a quarter of all the plaintiffs in my
survey used any direct evidence at all, as shown in Table 5.
This number falls to about 20% among compromised
plaintiffs (25% for the possibly-compromised). Because
compromised plaintiffs rarely seem to use direct evidence,
even if courts were to give such evidence significantly more
weight than they now do, it would probably not make much
of an overall difference in the way cases are resolved.67

65. Rossiter v. Potter, No. 02-12192-MBB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10422, at *8
(D. Mass. May 23, 2005).
66. The combination of “direct” evidence of illicit intent and legitimate reasons
for firing is sometimes handled doctrinally through the framework of “mixed
motives” analysis, under which the employer may have both permissible and
impermissible motivations for its actions. Again, the details are not relevant for
our purposes.
67. I assume that there would be no “supply side” response to a change in the
importance of direct evidence, since plaintiffs already use all of the direct evidence
they have—they would be foolish not to.
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Compromised

Possibly
Compromised

NonCompromised

Total

Direct
Evidence

18

23

49

90

Column %

14.5%

17.6%

45.4%

24.8%

Row %

20.0%

25.6%

54.4%

100.0%

No Direct
Evidence

106

108

59

273

Column %

85.5%

82.4%

54.6%

75.2%

Row %

38.8%

39.6%

21.6%

100.0%

Total

124

131

108

363

Column %

100%

100%

100%

100%

Row %

34.2%

36.1%

29.7%

100.0%

χ2 (2, N = 363) = 35.2, p < 0.01
Table 5: Number and Distribution of Title VII Opinions, by Compromised Status
and Use of Direct Evidence
Source: Author’s survey of employment discrimination opinions, detailed in Appendix.
Note: χ2 test for independence of compromised status and type of evidence across all 3
columns and both rows, 2 d.f. Alternative specifications (omitting the “possibly
compromised” column altogether, or combining the “compromised” and “possiblycompromised”) with 1 d.f. yield essentially identical results.

2. Comparison Evidence
The most common way for compromised plaintiffs to
make a case of discrimination—especially in race
discrimination cases—is through comparison evidence. This
evidence is designed to show that a similar worker from
another group who committed similar misdeeds was treated
more favorably than the plaintiff. Logically, the argument is
compelling. If A and B are identical (except for race), both are
guilty of identical misdeeds, and A was fired while B was not,
an inference of race-based treatment would be warranted.68
Table 6 demonstrates that 57% of race discrimination
plaintiffs (96 of 168) rely on comparison evidence. The
tendency to use comparison evidence is somewhat stronger
for compromised plaintiffs (39 of 64, 61%) than for noncompromised plaintiffs (20 of 38, 53%).
68. Presumably, the employer might argue that he acted randomly—flipped a
coin—to decide which of the two otherwise identical workers should be fired for
their misdeeds. Or he could claim that he used factors such as Zodiac signs. But
neither explanation would likely be credible, and I know of no cases in which such
explanations are actually advanced.
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Possibly
NonTotal
Compromised Compromised

39

37

20

96

60.9%

56.1%

52.6%

57.1%

Row %
No
Comparison
Evidence
Column %

40.6%

38.5%

20.8%

100%

25

29

18

72

39.1%

43.9%

47.4%

42.9%

Row %
Total
Column %
Row %

34.7%
64
100%
38.1%

40.3%
66
100%
39.3%

25.0%
38
100%
22.6%

100%
168
100%
100%

χ2 (2, N = 363) = 0.7, p = 0.7
Table 6: Number and Distribution Title VII Race Discrimination Opinions, by
Compromised Plaintiff Status and Presence of Comparison Evidence
Source: Author’s survey of employment discrimination opinions, detailed in Appendix.
Note: χ2 test for independence of compromised status and type of evidence across all 3
columns and both rows, 2 d.f. Alternative specifications (omitting the “possibly
compromised” column altogether, or combining the “compromised” and “possiblycompromised”) with 1 d.f. yield essentially identical results.

In practice, however, no one is ever completely identical
to anyone else, so actual comparators can never provide
perfect evidence of discrimination. The key question then
becomes how close of a comparison is required before the
inference of discrimination can be sustained. In fact, the
standards for who counts as a comparator and what counts
as a similar misdeed are quite stringent. Although the rules
vary slightly by circuit, most courts require comparators to
be virtually identical to the plaintiff in every significant
respect. The requirement that “[t]he comparator must be
nearly identical to the plaintiff” is designed “to prevent courts
from second-guessing a reasonable decision by the
employer.”69
69. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004). A
typical formulation of the standard for comparison is that “to establish disparate
treatment a plaintiff must show that the employer ‘gave preferential treatment
to [another] employee under nearly identical circumstances’; that is, that the
misconduct for which [the plaintiff] was discharged was nearly identical to that
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Courts could of course broaden the scope of permissible
comparisons between plaintiffs and similarly compromised
comparators, although it is not completely clear how one
might precisely formulate a laxer standard. Judge Posner
articulated a somewhat looser standard of comparison in the
Crawford case cited earlier, suggesting that “[t]he cases that
say that the members of the comparison group must be
comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects get this
right.”70 But the difference between “nearly identical” and
“comparable in all material respects” is in practice likely to
be quite small.
Of course, compromised workers would find a looser
standard of comparison to be helpful, since the formal reason
they lose—the doctrinal sticking-point—is that their chosen
comparators are insufficiently similar to them.71
A relaxation of the comparability requirement would
entail some costs, however. One obvious cost is the increased
likelihood of mistaken pro-plaintiff verdicts (type II errors).
Of course, trading-off the frequency (and costs) of type I
versus type II errors is inherently subjective in this context.
But in a way, that is precisely the point: the fact that a
substantial proportion of plaintiffs are compromised means
that outside observers will have a hard time agreeing on
which plaintiffs should prevail. In turn, this means that it
will be hard to achieve consensus on the relative frequency of
the two kinds of errors, let alone the fraught issue of the
relative costs of such mistakes.
A second potential problem, alluded to above, is that
relaxing the rules for who constitutes a legitimate
comparator requires courts to scrutinize personnel policies
engaged in by . . . [other] employees.” Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci.
Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
70. Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 2006).
71. For example, in Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, the plaintiff was an
African-American corrections officer who was fired after having an affair with a
prisoner. She pointed to two whites who had had relationships with prisoners but
were not similarly disciplined. 390 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1209-10, 1213 (M.D. Fla.
2005). But her comparators had maintained “existing relationships with people
who were later convicted” while she began her relationship with someone while
he was a prisoner, and that difference was enough to invalidate the comparison
according to the court. Id. at 1213.
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with much more care than they now do. Under a laxer
standard, courts would have to take seriously such questions
as whether a (white, male) prison guard who escaped firing
for illicitly fraternizing with a prisoner he had known prior
to her incarceration is really “the same” as a (black, female)
guard who was fired for fraternizing with a prisoner she had
met for the first time after he was already in jail. Such
comparisons are understandably unappealing to judges who
are reluctant to intrude into the relationship between
employer and employee.
Two leading employment discrimination scholars have
produced lengthy and cogent critiques of the doctrines and
practices governing plaintiffs’ use of comparator evidence.72
Both recognize that the strict standard of comparison
required by courts is highly disadvantageous to plaintiffs.
Professor Charles Sullivan suggests that the problem arises
from judges’ unwillingness to take seriously the baseline
prevalence of discrimination in the workplace. He offers a
thoughtful doctrinal solution: courts should rely on expert
testimony to define who is close enough to count as a valid
comparator for proving discrimination.73 Rather than listing
“differences between plaintiff and proffered comparators and
then apodictically declar[ing] them too great to be sufficient
to infer discrimination,” as is current practice, “the better
view is to ask whether the differences are such that a
reasonable employer is likely to look to them in making the
decision in question.”74 Proof of whether someone is
reasonably comparable to the plaintiff would be established
through the testimony of a human relations department or
an employment expert witness. But of course, Sullivan’s
solution to the comparator problem would inevitably come at
the expense of employers’ complete discretion to fire at will.
Professor Suzanne Goldberg focuses more broadly on
how courts have come to require (or nearly so) a valid
comparator to sustain a claim of discrimination, even when
plaintiffs’ underlying theory of liability is not amenable to
72. See generally Goldberg, supra note 17; Sullivan, supra note 17.
73. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 192, 197.
74. Id. at 229 (emphasis in original).
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comparison evidence.75 In the garden-variety Title VII firing
case, there is often a plausible reason for the plaintiff’s
discharge, so the best way to demonstrate that the employer
was acting on the basis of an illegitimate, rather than a
legitimate, motive will often be some kind of comparison
evidence. In these run-of-the-mill cases, the kinds of
difficulties adduced by Goldberg do not usually apply.
Some scholars argue that it is appropriate to use Title
VII as a vehicle for revamping employment practices
generally.76 Others would presumably decry such a
development.77 Whatever one’s policy preferences, my point
is simply that there cannot be much of an increase in the win
rates of compromised plaintiffs without a substantial
ratcheting-up of judicial supervision of employment
practices. Among compromised plaintiffs, it is just inherently
difficult to tell who has been discriminated against and who
has not. Detecting this kind of discrimination requires
careful scrutiny of whether worker A is really “the same as”
worker B, and this kind of exercise in applied ontology is
never simple.
3. Offense Severity Evidence and the “Just Cause
Problem”
Courts are routinely asked to consider whether a
compromised plaintiff’s behavior was not sufficiently serious
to justify the adverse treatment about which he or she is
75. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 742. Intersectional claims of discrimination
based on more than one protected category (for example, race and gender) make
it difficult to find appropriate comparators. Id. at 736. Comparators are also
problematic, Goldberg notes, in the opposite circumstance: when an employer
discriminates against a subset of protected class members (for example, Latinos
with accented English, or African-Americans who wear their hair in dreadlocks).
Id. at 737. Finally, claims based on “structural” impediments to equal workplace
participation make it difficult or impossible to locate relevant comparators. Id. at
737-38.
76. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool
for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659 (2003).
77. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 76-77 (1992); Amy L. Wax, The
Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979 (2008).
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complaining. And equally routinely—indeed, almost
universally—courts decline to pass judgment on this issue.
The reason (sometimes explicitly stated, but often lurking in
the background) is that to do so would be to intrude unduly
on an employer’s freedom to make firing decisions.78
Language such as this is typical:
Evidence that the employer should not have made the termination
decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used
poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the
employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility. “The relevant
inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise,
fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and
acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”79

Indeed, courts have a particular phrase they use to signal
that they will not take such evidence seriously. We are not,
courts frequently assert, “a super personnel department”
sitting in judgment of the wisdom of the defendant’s business
practices.80
Taking offense-severity evidence more seriously is
conceptually the easiest technique courts could adopt to
78. Among others, Richard Michael Fischl has written insightfully about how
“[e]mployees who have discharge claims that are compelling as a matter of
fairness, but which do not meet the requirements of proof under discrimination
law, frequently attempt to squeeze their ‘square peg’ of a case into the ‘round hole’
of the applicable legal category.” Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the
Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163,
181 (2007). The employment at-will doctrine thus casts a substantial shadow over
employment discrimination cases involving discharged workers, as so many cases
do.
79. Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1169-70 (10th
Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
80. Verniero v. Air Force Acad. Sch. Dist., 705 F.2d 388, 390 (10th Cir. 1983).
Verniero, apparently the first opinion to use the phrase, provides a clear
illustration:
We agree with the district court that “[i]t is not the duty of a court nor is
it within the expertise of the courts to attempt to decide whether the
business judgment of the employer was right or wrong. The court is not
a super personnel department. All that a court does is to exercise a very
limited review of the employment practices of an employer to see if the
practices are shown to be lawful . . . .”
Id. (internal citation omitted). The phrase “super personnel department” has been
used in 2924 federal district court opinions as of February 19, 2016.
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expand the rights of compromised workers. Even a court that
is unwilling to “second guess” an employer’s firing decisions
should appreciate that the less “wise, fair or correct” an
employer’s proffered reasons are for its decision, the more
likely it is that the real reason for the decision was
discriminatory.81 Put the other way around, the less-serious
the infraction the compromised employee was fired for, the
more credible it is that the employer had an illicit motivation
for the firing. Nevertheless, courts are deeply reluctant to
consider whether the compromised worker’s failures—often
quite real ones—are “sufficient” to cast doubt on the decision
to fire him or her.
A good example of this problem is Smith v. Monsanto,82
in which the plaintiff, an African-American, was terminated
for his unauthorized removal of three rag towels from his job
site, apparently to dry his car in the building’s parking lot.
The employer offered evidence that the plaintiff had no
better-treated comparators, demonstrating to the court’s
satisfaction that over the past thirty years, all thieves with
less than five years of seniority (as had plaintiff) had been
fired.83 But no evidence was ever introduced concerning what
kinds of incidents counted as thefts, and it seems entirely
plausible that whites might have gotten away with minor
infractions of the kind for which Smith was fired. Even in the
absence of strong comparison evidence, the triviality of
Smith’s offense casts doubt on the employer’s motivation for
firing him.
There is a difference between someone caught stealing
$100 from the cash register and someone removing three rag
towels (market value $1) under the mistaken but reasonable
belief that this was permissible.84 Firing someone for a minor
81. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149
(2000) (disbelief of employer’s explanation, together with plaintiff’s prima facie
case, may suffice to establish discrimination).
82. Smith v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 721-24.
84. The plaintiff in Smith v. Monsanto testified that others had taken towels
to dry their cars, and that he thought doing so was permissible. Id. at 721. The
defendant asserted that it had not known about the practice and would not have
condoned it. Id. at 724. Even if this were true at the level of official policy,
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infraction is more likely to be discriminatory than firing
someone for, say, assaulting a supervisor, precisely because
it is plausible that other towel-stealers were treated better
than the plaintiff (and implausible that other assaulters were
treated more favorably).85 Taking three rag towels, or setting
off firecrackers on the job,86 is precisely the kind of behavior
that a white worker might be allowed to get away with, but
that a black employee might not. Low-severity misbehavior
that could easily be covered up by a friendly supervisor is
particularly likely to be subject to unequal discipline on the
basis of membership in a protected class. Thus, from the
perspective of employment discrimination law, it would make
sense for courts to acknowledge such “severity” evidence as a
compliment to the other kinds of evidence (direct and
comparative) that can be used to draw inferences of
discrimination. But this rarely happens in practice.
It is important to acknowledge the tensions that arise
when, as here, the imperatives of employment discrimination
run up against the principles of employment law. By
definition, taking account of offense severity evidence
requires courts to assess “the seriousness” of what the
plaintiff did wrong. Ineluctably, that means at least some
erosion of the background rule of employment at-will, which
is typically understood to give employers virtually unfettered
discretion in deciding who is fired and why. If an employer
can fire anyone at any time for any reason, then all firings
are always legally “justified,” and asking whether a
particular employee’s misbehavior is “sufficient” to “justify”
her or his firing verges on an oxymoron.
Ultimately, the only way to expand the protection of antidiscrimination law to compromised workers may be to

however, it is easy to imagine low-level supervisors turning a blind eye to towelremoving (at least when the removers were white), so that management would
never learn of such behavior.
85. See, e.g., Barry v. Noble Metal Processing, Inc., 276 F. App’x 477, 478-79
(6th Cir. 2008) (assault on supervisor).
86. Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, No. 1:06-CV-213, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 94175, at *2-3 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007).

2016]

THE COMPROMISED WORKER

603

significantly curtail the employment at-will doctrine.87 But
some compromise short of full just cause protection might be
possible. Firing has been dubbed “‘the industrial equivalent
of capital punishment,’” reserved—at least in principle—only
for the most serious offenses.88 Even if employers are entitled
to fire for “no reason,” that does not mean that they will
frequently choose to do so. It should, therefore, be possible for
a court to consider whether employers typically fire people for
the kinds of things the compromised plaintiff did, without
thereby inevitably moving to a just cause firing regime. Put
another way, even if an employer is legally entitled to fire for
any reason, it is still possible to ask whether, in fact,
employers do (or this employer did) fire for the kind of
behavior that gave rise to a particular employment
discrimination claim.
In Smith v. Monsanto, for example, a court could ask
whether other employees had been fired for offenses as minor
as removing three rag towels, even if the other offenses were
not identical to what Smith actually did. This question would
require assessing the relative severity of different kinds of
misbehavior (taking home three pens versus removing three
rag towels), and that comparison is admittedly not
straightforward. But neither would such a relatively modest
inquiry require the abandonment of at-will employment.
B. Nepotism or Favoritism
Employment discrimination law is a response to a
particular set of problems. As implicitly defined by the 1964
87. Long ago, Alfred Blumrosen proposed that employment discrimination law
had essentially swallowed-up employment law in this respect. Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to “Just Cause”
Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519, 519-20 (1978), Blumrosen’s
syllogism ran as follows: (i) McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company
applied anti-discrimination law to all workers, regardless of race; (ii) antidiscrimination law requires an employer to give a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for a challenged action; (iii) thus, any fired worker can allege race
discrimination and force the employer to provide a “legitimate” reason for his or
her firing. Id. at 524-27.
88. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 421 (1981) (quoting M.
Jay Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions’ Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 IND.
L.J. 472, 481 (1975)).
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Civil Rights Act and related statutes, the problem of
unjustified unequal treatment in employment has been
identified as “discrimination”: negative treatment of persons
because of their membership in one or more sociallydisfavored groups. But consider the case of black worker X,
who is fired after shooting off firecrackers at work or
derailing boxcars, while white worker Y, who also did these
things, was punished less severely. What is anomalous may
not actually be the firing of X, but the more favorable
treatment accorded to Y.
Framed this way, some compromised plaintiff cases start
to look more like cronyism or nepotism (favorable treatment
of whites or males) than discrimination. The question
implicitly posed in these cases is which frame one chooses,
favoritism toward one group or hostility toward another.
The framing matters for two reasons. First, courts have
occasionally struggled with this issue, and seem mostly to
have taken the view that, at least in this context, the
intentional discrimination forbidden by federal statutes must
be based on animus.89 In consequence, decisions based on
favoritism are usually held to lie outside the purview of the
antidiscrimination regime.90 It is hard to see why this follows
89. Of course, there is also effects-based disparate impact liability available
under some employment discrimination statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(2009) (authorizing disparate impact liability under the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
90. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583 (1978) (hiring
by word-of-mouth through current employees is not disparate treatment because
the employer had legitimate reasons for its practice); Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d
1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[E]mployer’s decision to save a white employee from
an impending layoff by giving that employee preference over an African-American
employee who did not face a layoff does not give rise to an inference of
discrimination” given plausibility of cronyism as motivation); Brandt v. Shop ‘n
Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 108 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is not
intentional sex discrimination . . . to hire an unemployed old friend who happens
to be male, without considering an applicant who is neither unemployed nor an
old friend and happens to be female.”); Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 54, 56 (1st
Cir. 1995) (white supervisor designed job description to fit his white male “fishing
buddy,” but such cronyism was not discrimination against black female applicant
who was denied the position); Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 527 (11th Cir.
1994) (awarding gas station franchises to relatives of current dealers constitutes
“[n]epotism [but] does not violate Title VII per se [although] it may be evidence of
intentional discrimination when it works to the detriment of a protected class.”);
Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 826 (4th Cir. 1989) (“‘[N]epotism’ by itself
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inevitably from the text of Title VII or the other
antidiscrimination statutes, and courts rarely articulate
compelling justifications for this conclusion.
Second, decisions based on racial favoritism may actually
lead to different long-run outcomes from those based on
racial animus. In the economist’s standard model of employer
animus-based discrimination, competitive forces should lead
to the disappearance of racial wage differences in the long
run.91 But when employers base decisions on favoritism
toward white workers, rather than animus against black
workers, both “nepotistic” and neutral firms can survive
indefinitely, and racial differences in wages need not be
eliminated, even in long run competitive equilibrium.92
Virtually all of the favoritism cited above arose in the
context of hiring while most compromised plaintiffs allege
discriminatory firing. Nevertheless, there would seem to be
some room to expand the protection afforded compromised
workers through a more robust conception of favoritism or
cronyism in employment discrimination law.
CONCLUSION
In an age when many plaintiffs are “compromised,”
effective employment discrimination law will require courts
to lose their fear of acting like a “super personnel
department”: compromised plaintiffs cannot be protected
is not actionable under a disparate treatment analysis. A racially discriminatory
motive cannot, as a matter of law, be invariably inferred from favoritism shown
on the basis of some family relationship.”). But see Fernandes v. Costa Bros.
Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 587 (1st Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Foster and noting
that a district court must not “accept uncritically an employer’s articulation of
cronyism as an explanation for its actions. Rather, the court
must . . . determine . . . whether [that] proffered explanation is the real reason for
the employer’s decision or, conversely, a pretext for discrimination.”); Gibson v.
Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers of Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s
Union, 543 F.2d 1259, 1268 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Since the relatives being preferred
were disproportionately white, the nepotism discriminated against blacks
whether or not appellees acted with a discriminatory purpose.”).
91. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 159 (2d ed. 1971).
92. Matthew S. Goldberg, Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage
Differentials, 97 Q.J. ECON. 307, 308 (1982).
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unless courts are willing to scrutinize employment decisions
more carefully than they now do. Ferreting out whatever
illegitimate motives might be in play when a compromised
worker is subject to an adverse employment action is next to
impossible with anything less than a careful and detailed
assessment of how serious the compromised employee’s
misbehavior actually was. Gone are the days when
discrimination entailed the outright rejection of exemplary
applicants or the firing of those with spotless records. Such
discrimination is easy to spot: if Smith has a perfect record
and is nevertheless fired, it is pretty easy to imagine that his
race played a major role in his discharge. But when Jones is
fired after doing something wrong, it is hard to know whether
he would have been retained had he been of a different race.
But if closer scrutiny of employers is required for
effective antidiscrimination law, it may be forbidden by the
at-will employment doctrine that essentially bars any
inquiry into the reasons why someone was discharged. There
is no tradeoff here, however, if one favors both tighter
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws and less deference to
employers in making discharge decisions.
APPENDIX: SEARCH CRITERIA & SAMPLE DEFINITION
Westlaw contains too many employment discrimination
cases to be searched or retrieved in one fell swoop. To give a
sense of the population size, I searched for (HE(TITLE-VII)
or HE(42 +1 U.S.C. U.S.C.A. +2 2000E)) & date(YYYY),
where YYYY was each year since 1966. In all, this search
located 42,765 opinions.93 I therefore randomly sampled 21
weeks—1% of the total—from the 2153 weeks between Jan.
1, 1966 and Dec. 30, 2006, and coded all cases located using
Key Cite searches94 for each of the 21 sampled weeks. This
yielded a total of 641 opinions. Some non-discrimination
cases were picked up, since Westlaw’s headnotes are less
than perfect, and even those opinions that did pertain to an
93. As of April 20, 2007. Westlaw’s ALLFEDS database was used.
94. All Topics>Employment Law>Discrimination>Title VII. This search had to
be run twice, once on the population of cases with headnotes and once without,
since the two databases cannot be combined.
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underlying employment discrimination case sometimes
lacked any factual detail, often because they were about some
purely procedural matter. I was thus left with 406 opinions
in which there was enough evidence to make a judgment
about whether the plaintiff had done something wrong or not.
(Thirty-three opinions involving more than one plaintiff were
also eliminated.).
The plaintiff’s status was coded using a three-way
classification.
Some cases unambiguously involved compromised
plaintiffs. In some of these, the plaintiff admitted that he had
done or failed to do whatever the defendant asserted was the
basis for his adverse treatment. In others, there was a finding
of fact about what the plaintiff had done or failed to do, or the
plaintiff never denied the defendant’s description of his
behavior. A minimal severity constraint was also applied, so
that someone fired for stealing a paper clip would not count
as compromised, even if they admitted that they had in fact
stolen the paperclip.
The “possibly compromised” cases consisted of those in
which the plaintiff disputed the defendant’s description of his
behavior or the description was sufficiently ambiguous to
suggest doubts about what actually happened. For example,
a “possibly compromised” case might be one in which the
defendant claimed that the plaintiff was fired for sleeping on
the job while the plaintiff denied that he was sleeping.
Similarly, if the defendant’s reason for taking adverse action
against the plaintiff was substantially unconvincing (“I fired
him because he stole a paperclip”), this was coded as “possibly
compromised.”

